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Abstract.  Over the past several decades, there has been an increase in the use of market-based 
approaches for environmental policy.  The purpose of this paper is three-fold: 1) to provide a 
review of the literature on auction-based approaches to environmental management, 2) to gain 
insight into the use and effectiveness of an alternative auction designs, and 3) to present con-
siderations for enhancing the use of flexible auction approaches for future environmental ap-
plication.  Specifically, this paper describes how innovative BMP auctions were used to dis-
tribute conservation funding in a small watershed in east-central Kansas and offers insights 
into their overall cost-effectiveness.  Overall, there were 61 bids for practices requesting a total 
of $98,524 in funding. Through the bid evaluation process, 46 of the bids were actually fund-
ed, which resulted in an estimated 2,901 tonnes of annual soil erosion reduction.  This came at 
a total cost of $62,566. The lessons learned from the project can help guide future conservation 
programs seeking market-based solutions to bring about environmental benefits and re-
searchers interested in analyzing the effectiveness of these mechanisms. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Among the principal challenges in dealing with 
agricultural nonpoint source pollution is determin-
ing appropriate incentives and the best policy de-
sign to induce producers to adopt pollution preven-
tion practices.  Despite years of effort and the in-
vestment of millions of state and federal dollars in 
various environmental incentive programs, many 
producers still choose not to participate in tradition-
al conservation programs and/or decide not to im-
plement best management practices (BMPs) on their 
agricultural fields (Smith et al., 2007).  Further, an 
agency’s ability to effectively target investments for 
the greatest environmental improvements for dol-
lars spent remains a vital yet difficult goal to even 
measure, much less fully achieve.   
The growing interest in market-based environ-
mental management stems partly from cost-
effectiveness (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991) and 
partly from the practical success governments have 
had in dealing with specific pollution problems such 
as sulfur dioxide (SO2) air emissions (Stavins, 1998) 
via these programs.  The SO2 program, enabled by 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, created a for-
malized market institution whereby emissions were 
tied to well-defined, transferrable property rights.  
Such formalized markets have also been applied to 
water-borne pollutants from agriculture, with over 
40 water quality trading (WQT) programs in place in 
the United States (Breetz et al., 2004).  Unlike the SO2 
market, however, WQT markets have suffered from 
low trading volumes, and many programs have 
yielded no transactions at all.  Transaction data from 
these markets are virtually nonexistent.  Hoag and 
Hughes-Popp (1997), Woodward and Kaiser (2002), 
and Peterson and Smith (2012) provided overviews 
of WQT initiatives and discussed a number of possi-
ble complications limiting participation.   
Despite the lack of past successes of market-
based approaches for water quality, interest remains 
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high.  As mentioned previously, WQT is frequently 
mentioned, investigated, and implemented as a pol-
icy alternative in a variety of watersheds across the 
globe.  In addition to WQT, more general market-
based approaches also are supported and promoted 
by several U.S. agencies including the largest agri-
cultural conservation agency, the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) (Knight, 2005).  For 
example, the 2011 request for proposals for the 
NRCS-supported Conservation Innovation Grants 
(CIG) explicitly encourages and promotes the use of 
“market-based systems” (NRCS, 2011).1  Seemingly, 
there is evident demand for more testing and analy-
sis of market-based approaches for environmental 
management.   
This paper describes a pilot project in which an 
innovative market-based approach was used to dis-
tribute conservation funding with the objectives of 
1) encouraging producer/landowner conservation 
participation by offering greater flexibility to im-
plement self-selected BMPs and 2) targeting funds in 
a cost-effective manner.  The study area was the 
Pomona Lake watershed in eastern Kansas.  In this 
project, BMP reverse auctions were used to help 
guide distribution of incentive funding.  The pur-
pose of this paper is three-fold: 1) to provide a  
review of the literature on auction-based approaches 
to environmental management, 2) to gain insight 
into the use and effectiveness of an innovative policy 
tool, and 3) to present considerations for enhancing 
the use of flexible auction approaches for future  
environmental application. 
This paper begins with a review of relevant liter-
ature related to the empirics of market-based  
conservation for water quality.  The next section 
provides a description of the methods used for con-
ducting a BMP auction in a small eastern Kansas 
watershed.  Following this section is a discussion of 
the auction results along with some insights into the 
relative cost-effectiveness properties of the auction.  
The paper concludes with thoughts and considera-
tions for enhancing the use of BMP auctions in the 
future.   
 
2. Literature review 
 
The United States Department of Agriculture’s 
(USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS) compared 
six hypothetical working-land conservation pay-
ment programs based on a fixed budget constraint 
                                                 
1 This has actually been the case many times over the past decade, 
not just in the 2011 request for proposals. 
(Cattaneo et al., 2005).  The hypothetical programs 
contained variations of design features: whether 
previous conservation efforts are rewarded or  
required for participation, whether incentives are 
based on practices or on performance, and whether 
producers are screened according to the relative 
benefits and costs of their working land payment 
program’s contract.  According to the researchers, a 
performance-based program with bid-down provi-
sions (similar to the BMP auction) could improve 
environmental performance (as measured by the 
Aggregate Environmental Index) by more than 15 
percent over current production patterns at the  
national level and by more than 17 percent in the 
Northern Plains region.  The researchers estimated 
that a performance-based bid program could be 
nearly 12 times more cost-effective as a “good-actor 
payments” program (which makes payments based 
on past implementation of conservation practices).2 
The researchers concluded that a performance-based 
bid program could produce more environmental 
gain per dollar of program expenditure when com-
pared to any of the other five programs analyzed. 
The USDA ERS published a series of economic 
briefs related to conservation program design (Han-
sen and Hellerstein, 2006; Johansson, 2006; Wein-
berg and Claassen, 2006).  In these papers, the  
authors pointed out how targeting farms and fields 
where conservation efforts are likely to generate the 
most profound or widespread environmental bene-
fits was one way to achieve conservation goals.  
They assert that in most cases effective targeting 
must rely on quality data, biophysical and economic 
models, and the opinions of local personnel.  The 
authors stated that in order to spend program dol-
lars cost-effectively, conservation program managers 
also must motivate farmers to participate, then select 
those applicants who offer the greatest environmen-
tal gain per dollar spent.  Bidding is one way to do 
that.  When the cost to enroll all interested farmers 
exceeds available funding, bidding allows program 
managers to select the best applicants by comparing 
contract offers based on environmental benefits to 
costs.   
In 2007, the Soil and Water Conservation Society 
(SWCS) and Environmental Defense published a 
series of reports focusing on major USDA conserva-
tion programs.  The intent of the assessments was to 
provide a better understanding of how well these 
                                                 
2 For example, under the Conservation Security Program (CSP), 
producers may qualify for payments based on practices that were 
adopted or installed before enrollment. 
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programs were achieving conservation objectives 
and how they might be improved (SWCS, 2007a; 
SWCS, 2007b).  The authors evaluated the cost-
effectiveness of Environmental Quality Incentives 
Program (EQIP) applications by comparing the  
anticipated environmental benefits to the cost of the 
anticipated contract.  The importance of evaluating 
cost-effectiveness was recognized both in the 2002 
Farm Bill and in the EQIP program implementation 
guidelines.  The report stated that the consideration 
of cost-effectiveness in the selection of BMPs not 
only improved program performance but also ad-
dressed issues of equity by creating a level playing 
field for small and large producers.   
According to assessments conducted by Envi-
ronmental Defense in 2003 and 2004, NRCS has had 
a poor track record of incorporating cost-
effectiveness into the conservation funding decision-
making process (Searchinger and Friedman, 2003; 
Friedman and Heimlich, 2004).  The researchers  
indicated that the most effective means of evaluating 
cost-effectiveness in EQIP applications was to create 
a ratio by dividing an application’s total environ-
mental points (e.g., soil erosion reduction, nutrient 
reduction, etc.) by its estimated total costs to select 
from among the pool of EQIP applications.  Our  
pilot project attempted to do something similar. 
Two BMP reverse auctions used in the Conestoga 
Watershed in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, al-
lowed producers to submit bids for the installation 
of BMPs (Greenhalgh et al., 2007).  Some of the 
BMPs submitted included contour strip cropping, 
grassed waterways, waste storage facilities, and ter-
races.  Overall, the $486,000 allocated to agricultural 
producers resulted in 92,000 pounds of phosphorous 
reduction.  This translated to an average cost-
effectiveness of $5.28 per pound of phosphorous 
reduction and an overall 8.4 percent reduction in 
annual phosphorous loading in the Conestoga wa-
tershed (Susquehanna River Basin Commission, 
2005).   
Reverse auctions also have been piloted in the 
NRCS Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP).  Accord-
ing to the Chief of NRCS, 1,417 hectares of wetlands 
were enrolled into the WRP through the reverse auc-
tion pilot program at an acquisition costs savings of 
nearly $820,000, or 14 percent (NRCS, 2006). 
Selman et al. (2008) further examined the cost-
effectiveness of the reverse auction used in the Con-
estoga watershed by comparing the results of the 
auction to traditional EQIP.  Specifically, the authors 
examined the contracts funded through EQIP in  
December 2005 and those funded through the  
Conestoga Reverse Auction in February 2006.  In 
total, EQIP received 19 applications for the Decem-
ber 2005 enrollment period and 13 of these were 
funded.  Phosphorus reductions were calculated 
using NutrientNet, which was the same program 
used to calculate the reductions in the reverse auc-
tion.3  The results showed that EQIP-funded projects 
were expected to reduce 10,520 pounds of phospho-
rous over the life of the projects at a cost of $275,552. 
To compare the EQIP allocations to the reverse 
auction, a virtual budget constraint of $293,000 was 
used for the February 2006 auction to make for a 
more valid comparison to the EQIP allocations (the 
actual February 2006 auction costs were $446,990).  
Imposing this constraint, the first 7 reverse auction 
contracts were compared to the 13 EQIP contracts.  
The authors found that the 13 practices funded 
through traditional EQIP resulted in a cost-
effectiveness of $275,552/10,520 = $26.19 per pound.  
On the other hand, the 7 practices funded by the 
reverse auction came at a cost of $292,635 with 
80,787 pounds of phosphorus reduction yielding a 
$3.62 per pound cost-effectiveness value.  Thus, the 
reverse auction was approximately 7 times more 
cost-effective than the traditional EQIP approach. 
While there were many similarities between the 
two sets of observations (e.g., similar types of BMPs 
were funded), there were some notable differences.  
The auction ranked bids based on a single environ-
mental outcome, whereas the EQIP contracts were 
ranked according to several resource concerns, not 
just water quality.  So, the EQIP-funded practices 
may have outperformed the auction in regards to 
other environmental, resource, and/or wildlife  
elements.   
Because the auction did not limit bid prices, it 
seemed to attract farmers who would not participate 
in traditional EQIP because of financial constraints.4  
In one instance, a farmer who bid the entire cost of a 
manure management system was funded by the 
auction because of the significant reductions in 
phosphorous achieved by this BMP.  This particular 
project, which was one of the most cost-effective of 
the entire auction, would not have been funded 
through traditional EQIP. 
                                                 
3 Available at www.nutrientnet.org , NutrientNet was developed 
by the World Resources Institute and is a suite of web-based tools 
used to facilitate market-based approaches to improving water 
quality. 
4 In EQIP, contract payments are based on fixed-rate payments for 
certain practices and cover no more than 75 percent of total pro-
ject costs. The reverse auction did not limit participants to bid-
ding the standard cost-share payment rates.  
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Connor et al. (2008) examined the cost-
effectiveness of the Catchment Care Australian con-
servation auction.  The Catchment Care was a sealed 
bid, first price, discriminant price auction where 
landowners submitted bids to a watershed man-
agement board proposing a suite of conservation 
actions and a price.  Bids were evaluated based on 
price and an environmental benefits index (EBI) 
score.  The cost-effectiveness of bids was calculated 
by dividing the EBI by the bid price.  The bids were 
ranked and selected for funding in order of cost-
effectiveness until the available funds were exhaust-
ed.  The auction outcome was then compared to  
estimated outcomes of two alternative payment  
policies: a) a uniform payment and b) a ‘ranked’  
uniform payment policy with selection of projects 
based on EBI/$.5 
In comparison to the auction approach, the uni-
form payment method resulted in 56 percent of the 
environmental benefits of the auction with the same 
level of overall expenditure.  The level of environ-
mental benefits varied widely, ranging from about 
17 percent to 98 percent of the environmental bene-
fits resulting from the auction.  Alternatively, in  
order for the uniform policy to achieve the same lev-
el of environmental benefits a 150 percent increase in 
costs would be necessary.  The finding that a  
uniform payment scheme was about half as cost-
effective as the auction was consistent with the  
previous studies of Stoneham et al. (2003) and White 
and Burton (2005).   
 
3. Methods 
 
Pomona Lake reservoir is located approximately 
30 miles (48 kilometers) south of Topeka, Kansas.  
The watershed (Figure 1) includes portions of Lyon, 
Osage, and Wabaunsee counties.  With a total water-
shed area of about 83,657 hectares (323 sq. mi.),  
Pomona Lake was constructed in 1963 and reached 
full pool in 1965.  The authorized purposes of the 
project include flood damage reduction, recreation, 
water quality improvement, and fish and wildlife 
management.  The main water quality threats to 
Pomona Lake are sedimentation, nutrients, and bac-
terial contamination.  The lake is among those listed 
on the state’s 303(d) list for water quality impair-
ment due to eutrophication and silt (Kansas  
Department of Health and Environment, 2001).   
                                                 
5 Connor et al. (2008) actually compared four payment policies, 
but only the two most relevant are discussed here. 
The state of Kansas uses a watershed manage-
ment planning framework that engages citizens and 
other stakeholders to join together in protecting and 
restoring Kansas water resources.  Each application 
of this framework to a specific watershed is known 
as a Watershed Restoration and Protection Strategies 
(WRAPS) project.  WRAPS projects are to be grass-
roots, stakeholder-driven processes.  These projects 
are supported through the Kansas Department of 
Health and Environment (KDHE) using funds from 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  
Section 319 and the Kansas Water Plan.   
Among the Pomona Lake WRAPS stakeholder 
leadership team’s goals was to reduce the amount of 
sediment that enters Pomona Lake.  The team 
agreed to direct BMP investments using an auction-
based approach.  The team insisted on a high degree 
of simplicity and flexibility in the BMP implementa-
tion criteria.  In short, BMPs did not have to conform 
to strict guidelines and standards typical of USDA-
funded BMP projects and participants could bid for 
practices not traditionally funded through other 
programs.  The main purposes of keeping the auc-
tion simple and flexible were to enhance the attrac-
tiveness of the auction to farmers and landowners 
unfamiliar with market-based conservation and to 
appeal to those who had been resistant to participat-
ing in USDA conservation programs.  It should be 
noted that the primary purpose of the BMP auction 
was not research, and it was understood that mak-
ing a simple and flexible auction program (operating 
very differently from existing USDA conservation 
programs) could pose later challenges in comparing 
its cost-effectiveness to that of other programs. 
Three BMP auctions were conducted in the wa-
tershed.  The first auction was held during the 
summer of 2007, the second took place during the 
summer of 2008 (from this point forward, simply 
2008A), and the third occurred during the winter 
months of 2008 (2008B).  It should be noted that, at 
the time, producers were not aware of the potential 
for successive auctions.  Furthermore, the results of 
previous auctions were not made readily available 
to producers. 
Using a field sign-up sheet, producers had the 
option of identifying soil erosion reduction BMP(s) 
they were willing to use on a field.  They could 
choose from the BMPs listed or write in their own 
BMP proposal to reduce soil erosion either on 
cropland or pasture/rangeland.  Next, they indicat-
ed the amount of money they would need to install 
and maintain the BMP(s) selected (for a minimum of 
one season), understanding that bids would be 
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ranked by cost-effectiveness.  They could sign up 
multiple fields, but the total amount per produc-
er/landowner could not exceed $5,000.  A maximum 
limit was put in place simply to prevent the money 
from being concentrated on one or a few producers. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Pomona Lake watershed map. 
 
The first objective of the Pomona BMP auction 
project was to estimate the amount of soil erosion 
reduction that would result from the adoption of the 
proposed agricultural BMPs.  Given a producer’s 
current cropping rotation, field legal description, 
and current use of agricultural BMPs, each bidder 
was assigned a baseline soil load (in tonnes per hec-
tare) based on the Revised Universal Soil Loss Equa-
tion (RUSLE2) model (NRCS, 2004).  When a pro-
ducer submitted a BMP bid, the baseline load was 
multiplied by the estimated soil erosion reduction 
efficiency.6  The amount of erosion reduction was 
measured in tonnes per hectare.  Guidance was 
available to producers during the bidding process 
                                                 
6 See Devlin et al. (2003) for the reduction efficiencies of accepted 
BMPs. In the case of new BMPs, the technical team (comprised of 
NRCS, Conservation District, and University Research and Exten-
sion personnel) estimated erosion reduction efficiencies employ-
ing a “consensus best guess.” 
for help in determining costs and baseline erosion 
values.7  
Producers were allowed to submit bids for the 
installation of up to three BMPs on the same field.  
The cumulative erosion reduction efficiency of mul-
tiple BMPs was derived from equation 1 (modified 
from the STEPL BMP Calculator) (STEPL, 2006): 
 
ܤܯ ௘ܲ ൌ 1 െ ∑ ்೔ሺଵି௘೔ሻሺଵି௘೔శభሻ…ሺଵି௘೙ሻ
೙೔సభ
∑ ்೔೙೔సభ
       (1) 
 
where n is the number of BMPs, Ti are areas being 
protected by a given BMP, ei is the pollutant removal 
efficiency of the ith BMP, and (1-ei) are pollutant-
retaining efficiencies. 
Since BMP order is important in calculating the 
overall BMP erosion reduction efficiency, this calcu-
lator ranks the individual BMPs in order from the 
                                                 
7 The majority of producers, however, did not seek much assis-
tance during the bid processes. 
156   Smith, Leatherman, et al. 
least to the greatest efficiency (e.g., the least efficient 
BMP is represented by e1 and T1 in equation (1)).  
This procedure benefits the producer insofar as it 
may overestimate the overall BMP reduction  
efficiency.8 
The next step was determining the cost per tonne 
of erosion reduction.  This was calculated by divid-
ing the per hectare bid price by the soil erosion  
reduction (equation 2).  The resulting value was  
expressed in dollars per tonne of erosion reduction. 
 
ܥ݋ݏݐ ൌ ஻௜ௗ஻ௌ௅∗஻ெ௉೐       (2) 
 
where Cost is the cost per tonne of erosion reduction; 
Bid is the bid price submitted by the producer in dol-
lars per protected hectare (e.g., if a 2 hectare vegeta-
tive buffer is treating runoff from 50 hectares of 
cropland, then the protected hectares are equal to 50 
hectares); BSL is the baseline soil load derived from 
the RUSLE model in tonnes per hectare; and BMPe  
is the soil erosion reduction efficiency of the BMP(s). 
The last step in the bid evaluation process was 
ranking the bids.  This was accomplished by simply 
ranking the bids from least to greatest, in terms of 
cost per tonne of soil erosion reduction.  The pro-
ducer who offered erosion reduction at the lowest 
price was contracted with first.  An amount of 
$20,000 was available for funding BMPs in 2007 and 
2008A while $27,525 was available for the 2008B  
auction.9  
When evaluating the BMP auction approach 
compared to traditional conservation programs the 
first question is one of relative cost-effectiveness.  
That is, what would the cost per tonne of sediment 
reduction have been if traditional programs were 
utilized instead of the auction?  Given the unique 
flexibility offered to producers in terms of BMP se-
lection, it is impossible to compare the auction tradi-
tional programs directly.  Hence, we calculated the 
costs and sediment reductions of applying “similar” 
BMP(s) to the same cropland fields (hypothetically) 
using traditional conservation funding.  This allows 
us to offer preliminary comparisons between these 
two approaches.   
 
 
                                                 
8 This was a decision supported by the stakeholder leadership 
team in an effort to promote the implementation of multiple 
BMPs on the same field. 
9 For additional information on how an auction can be designed 
and implemented in a watershed, interested readers are referred 
to Smith et al. (2009). 
4. Results and discussion 
 
In the 2007 auction, 24 bids for practices request-
ing $19,062 in funding were submitted.  Because this 
was less than the allotted $20,000 budget, all the bids 
were funded.  The bids came from 13 landown-
ers/producers.  Almost half (11) of the practices 
were “stacked” on top of other traditional conserva-
tion program payments, which was allowed under 
the auction rules.  The BMP projects were of various 
types: 5 vegetative buffer establishments, 4 re-
shaping of terraces, 4 permanent vegetation estab-
lishments, 2 grass waterway establishments, 1 ter-
race establishment, and 8 projects falling into the 
“other” category.10 
The initial baseline soil loss at the edge of the 
fields, as estimated from the RUSLE model, totaled 
1,128 tonnes of soil across the 24 sites.  Based on es-
timates and calculations, 851 tonnes of soil loss were 
reduced at the edge of the field for an overall ero-
sion reduction efficiency of 75.4 percent.  The 851 
tonnes of soil loss reduction came at a cost of $19,062 
for an overall cost-effectiveness of $22.40 per tonne.  
The lowest bid received in the 2007 auction was for 
establishing quail habitat at $1.07 per tonne of soil 
erosion reduction while the highest bid received was 
for re-shaping existing terraces at $2,205.00 per 
tonne of soil loss reduction.  The variation in pro-
ducer bid prices per tonne of erosion reduction is 
graphically depicted in Figure 2.  A full description 
and ranking of all of the bids can be obtained from 
the authors upon request.   
Examining Figure 2, one will notice the sharp in-
crease in steepness of the marginal cost curve for the 
2007 auction and may question why all bids were 
funded when there were some bids significantly 
greater than the rest.  For this inaugural auction, the 
Pomona stakeholder leadership team chose not to 
decline these higher bids.  In some instances, how-
ever, it may be logical to put a (reserve) bid 
($/tonne) ceiling and choose not to fund bids that 
exceed this limit.  Determination of this bid ceiling 
could be based on historical averages from tradi-
tional conservation programs, by statistical methods 
(e.g., a given number of standard deviations away 
from an “Olympic” average), or a variety of other 
approaches.11 
                                                 
10 The “other” category includes BMPs such as: repairing creek 
bank, creating a diversion, establish quail habitat, reshape 
washed out area, build up waterway berm, and other BMPs not 
specifically listed on the bid sheet. 
11 An “Olympic” average is the average after removing the high 
and low values. 
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Figure 2.  Variation in Pomona Watershed producer bid price for 2007 and 2008 auctions.  
 
In the 2008A auction, 20 bids for practices re-
questing a total of $37,508 in funding were submit-
ted.  Due to the $20,000 funding limit, only the 9 
most cost-effective bids were funded (at a total cost 
of $17,25012) and the remaining 11 bids were reject-
ed.  The proposed BMP projects included: 8 terrace 
establishments, 6 re-shaping of terraces, 2 perma-
nent vegetation establishments, 2 combinations of 
BMPs, 1 grass waterway establishment, and 1 pro-
ject in the “other” category. 
Just focusing on the 9 fields where BMPs were 
accepted, the initial annual baseline soil loss was 
3,658 tonnes over 92 field hectares.  The accepted 
BMPs were estimated to reduce 1,224 tonnes of soil 
erosion for an overall soil erosion reduction efficien-
cy of 33.4 percent.13  The cost-effectiveness of the 
2008A auction was $17,250/1,224 tonnes = $14.10 
                                                 
12 The next “best” bid was for $3,200 which would have exceeded 
the $20,000 budget by $450.  The bidder was given the option of 
lowering their bid to $2,750, but this offer was declined.  The 
bidder indicated that they would most likely wait until a future 
auction. This seems to be more evidence that bidders are bidding 
at or close to their “true” costs. 
13 This is the expected sediment reduction for the first year. After 
that, sediment reductions may increase or decrease depending on 
the amount of maintenance performed as well as other factors 
(e.g., as the type and density of vegetation changes). 
per tonne.  The variation in cost-effectiveness for all 
of the bids received in 2008A can be seen in Figure 2.  
Note that this figure includes all bids received; some 
were not funded. 
The 2008B auction resulted in 17 bids (4 re-
shaping of terraces, 7 terrace establishments, and 6 
“other”) for practices requesting nearly $42,000 in 
funding.  After the bids had been evaluated and 
ranked only 13 of the bids were funded.  In regards 
to the 13 accepted bids, the fields had a total annual 
baseline soil loss of 1,364 tonnes.  The implementa-
tion of BMPs was estimated to reduce soil loss by 
826 tonnes for an overall reduction efficiency of 61 
percent.  This came at a cost of $26,254 or $31.78 per 
tonne.  The variation in cost-effectiveness for all of 
the bids received in 2008B can be seen in Figure 2. 
Altogether, the three auctions resulted in an es-
timated 2,901 tonnes of soil erosion reduction (see 
footnote 13).  This came at a total cost of $62,566 
which translated into an average cost-effectiveness 
of $21.57 per tonne.   
As indicated, there were five bids for installing 
vegetative buffers.  Only two of the five bids were 
independent of another conservation program.  
Three of the five bids were “stacked” on the Contin-
uous Conservation Reserve Program (CCRP)  
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cost-share and incentive payments for a 10-15 year 
period.  The CCRP offers one-time cost share pay-
ments to cover 90 percent of the county average cost 
of installing a buffer.  In addition, there is a sign-up 
incentive payment of $247 per hectare.14  The CCRP 
also offers annual incentive and maintenance pay-
ments equal to 120 percent of the county cropland 
rental rate and $9.88 per hectare per year for ten 
years, respectively.  In Kansas, the overwhelming 
majority of producers utilize CCRP for vegetative 
buffer establishment versus other funding sources 
such as EQIP.  Hence, CCRP is the most viable fund-
ing alternative for vegetative buffers and will be 
used for the cost-effectiveness comparison. 
Using the KSU-Vegetative Buffer decision-
making tool (Smith and Williams, 2007), we calcu-
lated the total present value of the CCRP payments 
for a one hectare vegetative buffer in Osage County, 
Kansas.  Using a discount rate of 5 percent, the total 
present value of the CCRP payments over a ten year 
span was $2,179 per hectare – this is the amount of 
money the program pays out over a ten year period 
measured in current dollars (e.g., 2012).  Examining 
the two bids for buffers that were not “stacked” on 
top of the CCRP payments, we can analyze the cost 
differentials.  The first vegetative buffer bid was for 
seeding 0.33 hectares to grass.  The producer’s bid 
for this practice was a $150.00 one-time payment.  
This was equal to a cost of $455 per hectare for a 
vegetative buffer.  Performing these same calcula-
tions for the second bidder, who bid $800 for a 0.24 
hectare buffer, the cost was equal to $3,333 per  
hectare.   
Considering these results, no clear conclusion 
can be drawn in terms of cost-effectiveness.  The first 
bid was significantly below the $2,179 average pre-
sent value costs of the CCRP, while the second bid 
was about $1,154 higher than the costs of the CCRP.  
The weighted average of the two is equal to $1,667 
per hectare which is $512 less costly than average.  
This indicates that the Pomona auctions were slight-
ly more cost-effective for vegetative buffers than 
traditional conservation funding programs (assum-
ing identical baseline soil losses and reduction  
efficiencies).   
One caveat to this preliminary conclusion is that 
the producers who installed vegetative buffers 
through the BMP auction were not required to  
                                                 
14 The majority of landowners installing vegetative buffers utilize 
the CCRP due to relatively higher levels of cost-share and incen-
tive payments compared to EQIP.  Thus, comparisons are made 
to CCRP and not EQIP. 
follow the same guidelines and regulations as those 
who installed buffers through a program such as the 
CCRP.  For example, there was no set timeline for 
how long the producer/landowner must leave their 
auction-funded buffer in place.  Though unlikely to 
occur, the producer could plow it after the first year 
with no penalty.  Nevertheless, it is important to 
consider other factors besides simply cost per tonne 
of sediment reduction. 
The other three bids for vegetative buffers were 
“stacked” on top of the CCRP payments and fall into 
a different category.  If we neglect the CCRP pay-
ments, however, the per-hectare costs for vegetative 
buffers were equal to one-time costs of $642, $82, 
and $158 per hectare.  The question here is whether 
these producers/landowners would have installed 
these buffers without the added incentive available 
from the BMP auction.  Unfortunately, we do not 
have that information. 
There were a total of six bids for establishing 
permanent vegetation on a cropland field.  All six of 
these bids were for fields in continuous soybean ro-
tations.  A total of 28.6 hectares of cropland were bid 
to be converted to permanent vegetation (bidders 
were not required to indicate the type of vegetation).  
The 28.6 hectares came at a total bid price of $8,050; 
yielding a per-unit cost of $281 per hectare.  The 
general sign-up conservation reserve program (CRP) 
funds the establishment of permanent vegetation on 
entire fields and is widely used, so it seems most 
reasonable to make cost-effectiveness comparisons 
to this traditional program.  The CRP operates simi-
larly to the CCRP except with slightly lower incen-
tives and a competitive sign-up process.  As before, 
using the KSU-Vegetative Buffer decision-making 
tool (Smith and Williams, 2007), we calculated the 
total present value of CRP payments on a per hec-
tare basis for land in Osage County, Kansas.  The 
total present value of CRP payments over a ten-year 
span was $1,507 per hectare (2007 dollars).  So, the 
cropland converted to permanent vegetation 
through the BMP auction came at an 81 percent cost-
savings over the CRP (assuming identical baseline 
soil losses and reduction efficiencies).  Again, as 
with the vegetative buffers, there were not many 
restrictions or guidelines (as there are with the CRP) 
placed on the producers/landowners who bid for 
this practice.  They are allowed to establish whatev-
er type of permanent vegetation they desire (e.g., 
warm or cool season grasses, legumes, etc.) and to 
hay and/or graze the vegetation if they desire; so, 
although not directly comparable to CRP, the BMP 
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does address a common complaint concerning too 
many restrictions. 
Several of the bids came for practices that are not 
currently funded under existing conservation pro-
grams.  An example would be “re-shaping existing 
terraces.”  There were 18 bids for re-shaping existing 
terraces.  The 18 producers/landowners requested a 
total of $14,900 for re-shaping terraces on 55.5 hec-
tares of cropland.  The RUSLE model estimated that 
the 55.5 hectares of cropland lost 465.0 tonnes of soil 
annually to erosion.  Assuming that re-shaping of 
terraces is 25 percent effective at reducing soil ero-
sion, 116.3 tonnes of soil would be saved annually 
for an average cost-effectiveness of $128 per tonne of 
soil.  Since re-shaping of terraces is not funded un-
der existing conservation programs, we will com-
pare this to a similar (but traditionally-funded) BMP 
such as terrace establishment.   
In 2007, EQIP would pay a 50 percent cost-share 
for terrace establishment based on a state average 
cost of $4.99 per meter.  Communication with the 
Osage County Conservation District revealed that 
nearly all producers and landowners utilize state of 
Kansas Soil Conservation Commision (SCC) funds, 
which pay a 70 percent cost-share rate, for terrace 
establishment.  For this reason, a 70 percent rate was 
used to estimate a one-time cost-share of $3.49 per 
meter.  To make relevant comparisons, the cost 
needs to be converted to a cost per protected 
cropland hectare.  According to Kling et al. (2007), 
the high and low estimates for the number of meters 
of terrace required to protect 1 hectare of cropland 
were 132.7 meters per protected hectare and 50.8 
meters per protected hectare, respectively.15 Using 
an average of 91.8 meters per protected hectare, the 
average cost per protected hectare was $320.66.  If 
terraces were established via SCC funds to the same 
55.5 hectares of cropland, 232.5 tonnes of soil erosion 
would be prevented (assuming 50 percent erosion 
reduction efficiency) at a total cost of $17,796.  Simp-
ly dividing the total cost by the annual soil erosion 
reduction, the average cost-effectiveness of the CRP 
on these fields would be equal to $77 per tonne of 
soil.  Therefore, in this sample, re-shaping terraces 
through the BMP auction resulted in higher sedi-
ment reduction costs compared to establishing new 
terraces through the SCC.  However, as the existing 
terraces continue to break down and erode, the auc-
                                                 
15 These estimates were based on Iowa cropland. Corresponding 
estimates for Kansas cropland were not found. Given that the 
Pomona watershed is located in the rolling terrain of eastern Kan-
sas, the authors felt it reasonable to make similar assumptions. 
tion approach may become more cost-effective.  For 
example, if we were to assume that re-shaping ter-
races would have an erosion reduction efficiency of 
42 percent, re-shaping terraces becomes more cost-
effective than establishing new terraces on similar 
fields (assuming the total costs remain the same).16  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There are several benefits to coupling an auction 
approach with flexible BMP implementation fund-
ing.  In the marketplace, where numerous producers 
are providing such information, project sponsors can 
select among competing bids to purchase the most 
cost-effective bundle of pollution-reduction invest-
ments.  Further, the information provides valuable 
insights into the incentive levels required to induce 
producers to adopt various desirable practices, 
which is a key piece of information lacking from 
other studies (e.g., Ortega-Pacheco et al., 2009). 
This paper provided a brief review of the conser-
vation auction literature followed by detailed exam-
ples of implementing BMP auctions in the Pomona 
Lake Watershed in Kansas.  While the bid data  
generated from these auctions comprise only small, 
case-specific samples, they suggest auction mecha-
nisms may have the potential to outperform tradi-
tional fixed-incentive policies in terms of cost-
effectiveness.  However, in the case of the Pomona 
BMP auctions, other factors besides simply cost per 
tonne of sediment reduction should be considered 
(e.g., length of time BMP must remain in place).   
Future research can shed more light on the cost-
effectiveness question using data from additional 
field and hypothetical experiments.  Recall that the 
Pomona BMP auction incorporated a high degree of 
simplicity and BMP flexibility per the requests of the 
local stakeholder group.  The bidders responded 
well to this and proposed many BMPs that reduced 
sediment loads but did not meet the rigid BMP rules 
and standards of traditional programs.  However, 
there are obvious tradeoffs that should be consid-
ered.  For example, on one hand, making an “across 
the watershed” assumption of a 50 percent decrease 
in soil erosion from the establishment of terraces 
might be simple and easy to understand among par-
ticipants.  But, on the other hand, it is evident that 
inaccuracies will occur at the individual case level.  
Along the same lines, providing farmers the  
                                                 
16 Recall that erosion reduction efficiencies were not necessarily 
calculated on a case-by-case basis, but rather all terrace re-
shaping projects, for example, were assumed to achieve a 25 per-
cent reduction efficiency. 
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flexibility to submit bids for converting cropland to 
permanent vegetation without fixed rules and engi-
neering standards could result in short-lived and/or 
ineffective BMPs compared to traditional programs 
such as the CRP.  The Pomona WRAPS leadership 
group understood the potential tradeoffs between 
such things as simplicity versus accuracy and flexi-
bility versus durability; however, they were com-
fortable with “thinking outside of the box”, putting 
trust in those who live and work in the watershed, 
and garnering high participation among the farmers 
and landowners in the watershed.  To those ends, 
they were successful.   
While effectively achieving the goal of high land-
owner and farmer interest and participation, these 
“flexible” rules made it difficult to compare cost-
effectiveness from a quantitative standpoint.  An 
approach similar to Selman et al. (2008), where 
BMPs funded via an auction must comply to the 
same rules and standards of EQIP, would allow for 
more direct comparisons either across time (as in 
Selman et al., 2008) or space to traditional conserva-
tion programs.  For example, one could compare to a 
control region or county.  In this type of analysis, the 
county which uses a reverse auction to administer 
all of their EQIP funds in one year could be com-
pared to a neighboring (and similar in most aspects) 
county that followed status quo EQIP.  Research 
could also be extended to examine alternative  
auction formats and the tradeoff between auction 
complexity and effectiveness.   
Overall, the BMP auctions provided an excellent 
opportunity for stakeholders to actively participate 
in applying scientific information via field scale 
modeling and economic theory to guide change in 
the watershed.  While these auction projects will not 
be mistaken for being controlled experiments, they 
do provide insight into the use and effectiveness of 
an innovative policy tool.  This project also serves as 
an example of how cooperation and collaboration 
between University Extension, NRCS, county con-
servation districts, Army Corps of Engineers, and 
local watershed stakeholders can yield positive  
results.  The lessons learned from the project can 
help guide future conservation programs seeking 
market-based solutions to bring about environmen-
tal benefits and researchers interested in analyzing 
the effectiveness of these mechanisms.   
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